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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sive effect in later actions involving the same parties concerning
the same issues. Therefore, an attorney who desires to concede
an insignificant property damage claim should strive for a settle-
ment and discontinuance of the action lest he endanger a subse-
quent personal injury defense.109
Res Judicata: Collateral attack on Mexican divorce.
In Schoenbrod v. Siegler,110 the parties to the dispute had been
married in the British West Indies. They subsequently entered
into a separation agreement in New York, and a month later were
divorced in Mexico, the husband appearing personally and the wife
by attorney. The separation agreement was incorporated into the
Mexican decree. Later, the husband discovered that the marriage
had been performed illegally and instituted an action in the Mexican
court to vacate the judgment of divorce; but he failed because
Mexico does not allow a divorce decree to be reopened for the
admission of new evidence. In the meantime the wife had insti-
tuted a suit against the husband for arrears due under the separa-
tion agreement, and the husband in turn instituted the instant
action to have the separation agreement declared null and void.
Evidence was introduced to show that while Mexico would not
permit a direct attack on its divorce decree, it would allow a col-
lateral attack on the separation agreement incorporated into the
decree. The wife's motion to dismiss was ultimately denied by
the Court of Appeals which held that the Mexican divorce was
not res judicata as to the validity of the marriage.
The Court of Appeals had previously held in Statter v.
Statter ' that a separation decree conclusively established the
existence of a valid marriage and therefore barred a subsequent
action for annulment. The Court in that case stressed the need
for stability and security 'in judgments and, therefore, if new evi-
dence were discovered, the proper procedure would be to vacate
the original decree.
The Court in the instant case, while recognizing that the con-
clusive effect on the validity of a marriage is the same when the
first judgment is for divorce rather than separation,1 2 and while
recognizing that it made no difference, because of comity, that the
109 See Schenker v. Bourne, 278 App. Div. 699, 102 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d
Dep't 1951); Johnson v. Tyler, 275 App. Div. 726, 87 N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d
Dep't 1949).
11020 N.Y.2d 403, 230 N.E.2d 638, 283 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1967).
1112 N.Y.2d 668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957).
1'12See Frost v. Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 23 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1st Dep't
1940), where a Nevada divorce was held to conclusively establish the exist-
ence of the marriage, thus barring a subsequent action to declare the mar-
riage void.
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earlier judgment was rendered by a Mexican court," 3 nevertheless
distinguished this case from Statter. While the litigant in Statter
could directly attack the first judgment, the plaintiff here had
already tried and failed to vacate the Mexican decree. Thus, his
only remedy was collateral attack in New York. Furthermore, the
Court noted that since Mexico would have permitted a collateral
attack on the decree our courts should permit such an attack.
Judge Burke, dissenting,114 agreed with the majority in prin-
ciple but thought that the Mexican lawyer's affidavit, submitted to
show that collateral attack was possible in Mexico, was too flimsy
to allow the Court to take judicial notice of that fact.
Since Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel I-" recognized the validity of the
bilateral Mexican divorce, the problem has arisen as to when such
a decree could be attacked. In determining what effect a foreign
judgment will have here,"', resort usually is made to the law of
res judicata in the foreign forum. In fact, New York now appears
to compare the decree of Mexico with that of a sister state and
applies the same rules as to res judicata. 17  Thus, for the purpose
of collateral attack of a Mexican decree, it need only be established
that the decree could be collaterally attacked there. From the
Court's treatment of the Statter case, the fact that Mexico does or
does not allow direct attack does not appear to be operative, so long
as collateral attack is permitted. The Court's basic position appears
to be that, "[g]enerally, there is no reason to give more conclusive
effect to a foreign judgment than it would be accorded by the
courts of the jurisdiction that rendered it." 118
ARTICLE 51- ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
GENERALLY
Civil Contempt: Defendant may immediately allege ill-health or
inability to pay.
In In re Hildreth,"9 the appellate division, first department,
held that on application to punish for civil contempt, it is within
"3'Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.Zd 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86 (1965).
11420 N.Y2d at 886, 230 N.E.2d at 642, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
"i 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
116 Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel it the United
States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rsv. 44, 63 (1962).
117 Both the majority and the dissents cited, with approval, Magowan v.
Magowan, 19 N.Y.2d 296, 226 N.E.2d 304, 279 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1967), which
held that a party could collaterally attack a sister state's decree only if the
sister state would allow it.
"'s Schoenbrod v. Siegler, 20 N.Y.2d 403, 409, 230 N.E2d 638, 641, 283
N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (1967).
12928 App. Div. 2d 290, 284 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1st Dep't 1967).
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